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NA'riONAL li.UTOMOBU,E AND CASUALTY INSUR-
1\NCE CO:;\IP ANY 
STATE BOARD OF 
lants. 
[1] Estoppel-- Parties 
will run 
require it. 
[2] Affected-Governmental Agencies.-'fhe govern-
ment may be estopped in tax but the case must be 
clear and the 
[3] !d.-Parties Affected-Governmental Agencies.-Failure to 
to and retained bail bondsmen 
their bail agents. 
for services in secur-
or failure of the 
of reports of 
he may have 
request (later 
general, is not 
the State Board of 
insurance com-
retained by 
[ 4] !d.-Parties Affected-Governmental Agencies.-Generally, 
failure to enforce statutes v.-m not estop a state agency from 
their enforcement 
[5] !d.-Parties Affected-Governmental Agencies.--Failnre to 
collect taxes which under though the 
official thinks should is not sufficient for an estoppel; 
See Am.Jur., H:Qhwmn 
McK. Dig. References 
[8, 9] § 408. 
Brokers, § 187; 
Actions for recovery of 
plaintiffs reversed. 
47 C.2d-13 







he has P make out an a!Juu""a"'vu 
of P 's bail. B 
P on baiL 
the bail 
not uc•:oc;,"a' 
a Receipt and Statement 
a breakdown as follows : 
"Bail Bond Premium ............... . 
'' J:i'ee for Arranging Bond ........... . 
'' Total Charges ................ . 
Upon instructions of the general agent, B will insert 
the sum of $20 opposite the item 'Bail Bond ' and 
$100 opposite the item 'Total Charges.' It is stipulated that 
these were G's instructions to B, but it is not clearly established 
that more than 75 per cent of the receipts were so broken down. 
B, having satisfied himself that the security offered by P is in 
all respects sufficient, posts a surety bail bond in the penal 
sum of $1,000 and secures the release of P from jail. At the 
end of the week during which this transaction was carried 
out, B reports to G, the general agent or supervising agent, of 
the surety company. B pays to G a consideration for the bond 
determined by the contractual arrangement between B and G. 
At the same time B deposits with G an additional sum as a 
'reserve' to cover possible losses on the bond. G then reports 
to S, the surety company, the total face amount of all bonds 
written during the period covered by the report and pays to 
S an agreed amount. G may also deposit an additional sum 
as a 'reserve' to cover possible losses on this and other bonds. 
S reports the sum of $20 or a portion thereof (there being no 
uniformity) as gross premiums received on account of this 
bond in its annual statement and in its tax return 
to the Insurance Commissioner." The taxes which were paid 
under protest and awarded by the judgments were on the 
amounts paid to and retained by the insurance companies' 
agents who solicited and obtained takers of bail bonds. There 
hence 
which was taxed 
this was held to be true even though the 
retained a of the 
amount for his profit and expenses. It is not ques-
tioned that the Constitution leYies taxes on the entire amount 
but heretofore the state has been collecting taxes on only 
the amount actually reeeived the 
Plaintiff companies contend that, as held by the trial court, 
the state is estopped to collect taxes on those premiums for 
the years, J 947 in the instant cases. Defendants contend 
there can he no the state in tax matters; 
that assuming estoppel is available, none was established here; 
and that in any event interest on the taxes paid under protest 
should not be allowed. 
'l'here is no dispute as to the facts. At the close of 1947, 
plaintif[s submitted reports to the state insurance commissioner 
of their gross * but did not include therein the 
portion of the reeeived by their bail agents as 
discussed above the Groves ease. The commissioner 
made his State Board of Equalization on the 
basis of the plaintiffs to him (see Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 12403) and the board assessed taxes on that basis against 
plaintiffs Rev. & Tax. § 12431 et seq.) and plaintiffs 
paid those taxes in 1948. In 1B51, the state's attorney general 
advised the commissioner that all the amounts received by 
the bail were taxable premiums and the commissioner 
advised plaintiffs that au additional assessment was being 
included in the 1951 assessments to inelude those amounts for 
1947. The additional assessments were paid under protest 
and recovery thereof allowed by the trial court. 
The gross tax law has been in effect since 1911, but 
until 1951 no company has the entire amount 
received by its bail agents. In licenses were required 
for bail agents and section 1800 was added to the Insurance 
*Those reports are required by law. (Rev. & Tax. Code, 9 12276.) 

Ii'.2d 798 see disenssion 
L.Rev. 71; 21 Univ. of 
it is the unusual 
tax cases; the must be clear and the 
authorities last ) . This is indicated by the 
rules in the field. "The of taxation shall never 
be 
particularly in tax matters. As a proposition this 
is sound law. Obviously, a tax administrator should not be 
390 
lose its revenues 
administrative official 
law. An 
which is in conflict with the statute 
is invalid and the is not bound thereby. [Cita-
tions.] The of the tax officials is to collect taxes imposed 
by law . . . it is no defense that taxes were not 
paid when due in reliance on an official of nonliability. 
'fhe is deemed to act with knowledge that adminis-
trative officials cannot bind the by their erroneous 
interpretation of tax statutes.' '' 
[3] The facts here do not establish a clear case of estoppel 
and injustice necessary in tax cases. The failure to collect 
the tax or object to the sufficiency of the reports of gross 
premiums made by plaintiffs, although the commissioner 
thought possibly they were insufficient as shown by his request 
(later withdrawn) for an opinion from the attorney general 
is not enough. The request to the attorney general for an 
opinion was not known by ; all knew was that 
no objection was made to their reports and taxes were not 
collected on the entire premiums received by them. [4] Gen-
erally ''. . . failure to enforce statutes of this state will not 
estop a state agency from their subsequent enforcement ( Cami-
netti v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 52 Cal.App.2d 321, 326 [126 
P.2d 165] ... )." (Richfield Oil Corp. v. Cmwford, 39 Cal. 
2d 729, 736 [249 P.2d 600] .) [5] The failure to collect 
taxes which are payable under a statute, even though the 
official thinks they should be, is not sufficient for an estoppel. 
(See Goodwill Industries v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 
117 Cal.App.2d 19; La Societe .Franeaise v. California Ernp. 
Com., supra, 56 Cal.App.2d 534; El Domdo Oil W arks v. 
McColgan, 34 Cal.2d 731, 739 [215 P.2d 4]; Gaylord v. 
Commissioner of Int. Rev., 153 F.2d 408; 40 Va.L.Rev. 313; 
Hotel Kingkacle v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 180 F.2d 310; 
Mt. Vernon Trttst Co. v. Cormnissioner of Int. Rev., 75 F.2d 
938.) And it has been held that an estoppel will not arise 
BD. OF 391 
6, 
the Insurance Commissioner in Los Angeles, 
1Yith regard to regulations governing the 
transaction of bail bonds and the conduct of hail and 
the approval by the Insurance Commissioner of 
certain forms of documents to be used in the transaction of 
bail bonds." 'l'his apparently was an investigation 
of the bail bond business and the matters considered were in 
the nature of police regulations for that business. Nothing 
was said about taxes and the commissioner was interested in 
having the to bail bond applicants advise them 
as to where the money he paid for the bond was going. ·while 
the and listed ' ' as the item 
which actually it could be referring only to 
net premiums rather than gross premiums upon which the tax 
is levied. There is no necessary relation between the receipt 
so given and taxes. Taxes >Yere not mentioned. [7] The 
eommissioner had authority to adopt rules and regulations 
for the conduct of hail bond business (Ins. Code, § 1812; see 
Smith v. Downey, 109 Cal.App.2d 745 [241 P.2d 618)) which 
have to do with the conduct of the business rather than taxes. 
(See Ins. § 1800 et seq.) [8] In regard to taxes 
the insnranee eompanies must make a report of their gross 
premiums to the commissioner (Hev. & 'l'ax. Code, § 12276) 
and the eommissioner makes a report to the State Board of 
Eqnal ization of the received eaeh insurer ( icl., 
§ J 2403). 'l'he board assesses and levies the tax § 12431) 
and notice thereof to the insurer § 12435) and they 
are to be paid to the state eon troller § 12624). Probably 
the eommissioner has authority to question the reports of the 
insurers to him but the tax is assessed by the board. 
and McComb, 
lL v. STATE Bn. OF EQUAL. 393 
P.2d 1034] 
could reasonably rely. I do 
not concur in any that as a matter of law an 
estoppel cannot be invoked by a taxpayer as against the gov-
ernment's claim for a deficiency, if in fact the taxpayer relied 
upon an administrative representation and as a result lost 
the opportunity to pass the tax on to others. 
a distinction must be recognized between the 
case wherein the taxpayer acts as a mere collection agent, 
and that in which a tax is imposed directly on the taxpayer. 
The unemployment insurance tax illustrates this distinction: 
the employer withholds a certain sum from the salary of his 
employes, as to which he acts as a collection agency only; 
he also remits a sum based on the total salaries paid, as to 
which he is the principal taxpayer. In such a case, if the 
taxpayer is informed by the proper authority that certain 
employes are not subject to the tax, and therefore no re-
mittances are made with respect to the salaries paid to such 
employes, and if the authority later changes its position and 
declares a tax due, the government may be able to collect the 
amounts the employer should have paid on his own account, 
but it will not be allowed to recover from the employer the 
amounts which should have been withheld from the employes' 
salaries. (Garrison v. State (1944), 64 Cal.App.2d 820 [149 
P.2d 711] ; La Societe Francaise v. California Emp. Com. 
(1943), 56 Cal.App.2d 534 [133 P.2d 47] .) 
Where a taxpayer has refrained from paying a tax for which 
he is primarily liable because of reliance upon an erroneous 
administrative interpretation, it has been held in a number of 
cases that he must pay an asserted deficiency, even though he 
would have been able to pass on the tax had he not relied 
on the administrative position that no tax was due. (Market 
St. Ry. Co. v. California State Board of Eqttalization (1955), 
137 Cal.App.2d 87 [290 P.2d 20]; Duhame v. State Tax Com. 
(1947), 65 Ariz. 268 [179 P.2d 252, 171 A.L.R. 684]; Crane 
Co. v. Arizona State Tax Com. (1945), 63 Ariz. 426 [163 P.2d 
656, 163 A.L.R. 261]; Bennetts, Inc. v. Carpenter (1943), 111 
Colo. 63 [137 P.2d 780].) Inspection discloses, however, that 
the Duhame and Bennetts cases are of little weight in Cali-
fornia. In Duhame the court disposed of the estoppel question 
by saying that ''there can be no estoppel against a government 
or governmental agency with reference to the enforcement of 
taxes" (p. 260 of 179 P.2d); similarly, in Bennetts the court 
merely stated that "It is a general principle of law that the 
doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked against any govern-
394 
Crane case, and the Crane case 
made in La Societe Francaise . 
supra, 56 
on the 
Societe Francaise case, as noted 
involved an insurance tax, and in that case the 
employer was held liable for the amounts he would have paid 
had the employes been properly included on its tax return, 
although not for the amounts which should have been withheld 
from the salaries of the particular employes. The Market 
Street l{ailway ease (involving the sales represents a 
square California holding by the District Court of Appeal 
that no estoppel will be raised merely because the taxpayer 
had a right to pass on the taxes to the purchaser, where he 
was under no statutory duty to do so, even though the only 
reason he failed to pass on the tax was because of reliance 
on the erroneous administrative ruling. But the principal 
basis of the Market Street Hailway case is in ultimate analysis 
(through the Crane the Societe Francaise case. 
The true theory of the Societe Francaise ease seems to 
appear at page 555 of 56 Ca1.App.2d, where the court stated: 
" ... in the 'present c:ase a proper for the protection 
of the interests of the government in its revenues, with recog-
nition also of a degree of responsibility on the part of the 
government to a taxpayer who has relied to his prejudice on 
an official ruling, is achieved by the taxpayer to dis-
charge that part of the tax burden which it was contemplated 
it should bear by the statute imposing the tax, while relieving 
it from liability for the employees' contributions and interest 
on delayed payments. The win pay from >its own 
funds as much as it would have paid btd for the 
erroneous administrative bnt it will not pay more." 
(Italics added.) But La Societe Francaise is essentially a 
nonprofit organization and there was no showing that it 
could have passed on its costs to its customers. In a similar 
ease, where the employer was an insurance company, the court 
relieved the taxpayer of liability both for the employes' share 
and for the employer's share of the tax. (Garrison v. State of 
395 
Dana-
' where the 
as that followed the District 
Garrison ease, declared that "\¥here 
it appears that it is policy that an administra-
tive officer should a decision with retroactive effect, it 
is the court's to curb his powers so as to serve 
that ") is to be assessed only for the 
amount whieh it would have paid from its own funds in the 
absenec of relianee upon the erroneous administrative aetion, 
then it is ineonsistent to eharge it for an amount which would 
have been passed on to, and borne by, the ultimate consumer 
had the tax been properly levied. This is espeeially true with 
respect to insurance companies, whose annual premium rates 
are a refleetion of their and anticipated operating costs. 
'l'hns it appears that a agency may be estopped 
to assert a tax where the reason for the original 
nonpayment was reliance OJJ an administrative representation 
which proved to be erroneous, if the taxpayer can show that he 
could and vvould have passed on the tax to his customers had 
he not relied em the ruling that it was not due, and that he 
can no longer so pass it on. Here, if the representations which 
were made by the state insurance commissioner had instead 
been made by the state board of equalization, a different result 
would be indicated. 
For the reasons and subject to the limitations above stated I 
concur in the 
concurred. 
Respondents' petitions for a rehearing were denied De-
cember 1956. 
